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I. INTRODUCTION
For the last eight years Bruce and Nancy Young have been doing what
people for thousands of years have felt obligated to do-giving a portion of
their wealth to their god. They have also been doing something else that people
have been doing for thousands of years-not paying their debts. As a result of
their nonpayment, the Youngs declared bankruptcy, but they continued to give
$13,450 in donations to the Crystal Evangelical Free Church while bankrupt. 1
Now the Justice Department has asked for it all back so that creditors can be
paid the money they are owed.2 But Baptists, Catholics, Lutherans, Mormons
and evangelical groups have rallied around the Youngs.3 They claim that, in
essence, their god has a super-ultrapriority claim on one's money and that god
must be put "first in the area of one's finances." 4 To the Youngs, and many
other people who take advantage of bankruptcy relief, god is the ultimate
creditor.
In the Judeo-Christian faith, such a giving of wealth is known as the
"tithe." 5 The concept of the tithe, however, is not limited to Judaism and
Christianity, but is universal in appeal. 6
* I would like to thank Professor Nancy B. Rapoport for the title of this Comment.
1Laurie Goodstein, Religious Groups Fight U.S. in Bankruptcy Case, WASH. POST,
May 23, 1994, at Al.
2Id.
3Id.
4 The Reverend Stephen Goold, senior pastor at the Crystal Evangelical Free Church,
referred to the tithe as "a biblical injunction... to put God first in the area of one's
finances." Id. at AS. Rev. Goold's "biblical injunction" can be found in the Book of
Malachi, where refusal to tithe is viewed as robbing god:
Will a man rob God? Yet you are robbing me. But you say, "How have we robbed
thee?" In tithes and contributions. You are cursed with a curse, for you are robbing me,
the whole nation of you. Bring the whole tithe into the storehouse, so that there may be
food in my house and test me now in this, says our Lord of hosts, if I will not open for
you the windows of heaven, and pour out for you a blessing until there is no more
need.
Malachi 3:8-12.
5 A tithe is a "tenth part of one's income, contributed for charitable or religious
purposes." BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 1484 (6th ed. 1990). The term "tithe" derives from
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Since the formation of the United States, the practice of tithing has enjoyed
the absence of governmental interference. The spheres of government and
religion have remained sufficiently separate so that no court had to determine
the degree to which government power may impose upon the practice of the
tithe. That is, until 1984.
In 1984 Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code ("Code") to require that
an individual debtor seeking relief from a consumer debt in Chapter 13 must
dedicate all of her "projected disposable income" to unsecured creditors in
order to meet the standard of good faith. 7 The Code defines disposable income
as "income which is received by the debtor and which is not reasonably
necessary to be expended.., for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a
dependent of the debtor .... ."8 The debtor must list and obtain judicial
approval of all "necessary expenses." 9 Thus, a bankruptcy judge must
the common Christian practice of giving a specified percentage of one's income to their
church-traditionally 10%. See, e.g., Genesis 28:22 ("Tais stone, which I have set for a
pillar, shall be God's house; and of all that thou givest me I will give the tenth to thee.").
From this section and other parts of the Bible, our understanding has come to be that a tithe
is 10% of one's income. In this Comment, however, I use the term much more broadly. I
do not restrict the term "tithe" to merely contributions of 10%, but rather I use it to
encompass any religiously compelled financial contribution-regardless of amount and
irrespective of faith. I have also chosen to use the term "god" with a lower case "g,"
realizing that not all faiths refer to their supreme being as "God."
6 See, e.g., ABDEL H. MAHMUD, THE CREED OF IsLAM 21 & n.10 (Mahmiud A.
Haleem trans., 1978) (defining the Islamic concept of zakah, or alms-tax, as a "statutory
portion of one's wealth given every year for the use of the needy and other services");
MELFORD E. SPiRo, BUDDHISM AND SOCIETY: A GREAT TRADITION AND ITS BURMESE
VICIssrrnUDEs 110 (1970) (describing the Buddhist belief that one-fourth of one's income
should be devoted to dana, or religious giving).
7 In order for a plan to be confirmed, a debtor must satisfy § 1325(b)(1), which states:
If the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to the
confirmation of the plan, then the court may not approve the plan unless, as of the
effective date of the plan-
(A) the value of the property to be distributed under the plan on account of such
claim is not less than the amount of such claim; or
(B) the plan provides that all of the debtor's disposable income to be received in
the three-year period beginning on the date that the first payment is due under the plan
will be applied to make payments under the plan.
11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1) (1988).
8 Id. § 1325(b)(2).
9Id.
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determine the legitimacy of allowing a debtor to claim the tithe as a necessary
expense.
Bankruptcy courts have been split for ten years concerning whether debtors
should be able to claim the tithe as a necessary expense and, thus, further
deprive their creditors of repayment. 10 Although most courts have denied the
tithe, some have found it mandated by the Free Exercise Clause of the
Constitution. 11 This issue has not been before the Supreme Court, but it
appears that nothing less than a decree from the High Court will bring a
modicum of uniformity to the analysis.
This Comment will analyze the free exercise implications of the choices
available to bankruptcy judges today. 12 It will view these options in light of the
recent overruling of the 1990 Supreme Court case Employment Division v.
Smith13 by Congress. 14 And it will come to the conclusion that in dealing with
bankruptcy and the tithe there are no clear answers. There are definite costs no
matter which option is taken. This Comment will argue that the best solution is
to deny tithing as a necessary expense in filing a Chapter 13 plan for
bankruptcy relief and that doing so does not violate the free exercise right of
the debtor.
II. BANKRUPTCY BACKGROUND
A. The 1984 Amendment
In order to fully appreciate the situation that exists in modem bankruptcy
jurisprudence concerning the tithe, a brief examination of the events leading up
to the 1984 amendments and a brief overview of Chapter 13 relief is necessary.
Bankruptcy is a remedial system provided for by federal law-more
specifically Title 11 of the United States Code. It is a collective remedy that,
with few exceptions, encompasses all of the debtor's assets and debts. It is
10 See infra part MII.
I1 See infra part Iff.
12 Note that allowing a debtor to tithe within the Chapter 13 bankruptcy framework
would also possibly violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. However,
because this Comment reaches the conclusion that bankruptcy courts should not allow the
tithe as a necessary expense in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, the Comment does not
reach that issue. Other constitutional rights may also be implicated, for example,
associational and free speech rights. A full discussion of all First Amendment rights possibly
affected, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
13 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
14 See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat.
1488.
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designed to afford relief to the debtor by resolving and settling current debts,
while at the same time protecting creditors and guarding their interests.
The current Code was enacted as the Bankruptcy Reform Act in 1978 and
underwent two major amendments in 1984 and 1986.15 Section 1325(a)
originally only required a debtor to file in good faith and to prove that
unsecured creditors would get no less in the Chapter 13 repayment plan as they
would in a Chapter 7 liquidation. 16 Debtors and creditors soon became
dissatisfied with the good faith and liquidation equivalence standard. Because
debtors could easily meet the "not less than" standard of section 1325(a)(4),
courts began to deny confirmation if the confirmation plan did not represent the
debtor's "best efforts"-even though there is no statutory basis for requiring
that result under section 1325(a)(4). 17
Courts began to reach disparate results depending on whether they applied
the best efforts approach and what they thought was a best effort. Some courts
15 Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101-1330).
16 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) provides:
(a) the court shall confirm a plan if-
(1) The plan complies with the provisions of this chapter and with the other
applicable provisions of this title;
(2) any fee, charge, or amount required under chapter 123 of title 28, or by the
plan, to be paid before confirmation, has been paid;
(3) the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by
law;
(4) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed
under the plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is not less than the
amount that would be paid on such claim f the estate of the debtor were liquidated
under chapter 7 of this title on such date;
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan-
(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan;
(B) (i) the plan provides that the holder of such claim retain the lien securing
such claim; and
(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be
distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the
allowed amount of such claim; or
(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to such holder, and
(6) the debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan and to comply with
the plan.
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
17 See, e.g., In re Burrell, 2 B.R. 650 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1980).
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required more than seventy percent payouts to unsecured creditors, 18 while
others would confirm plans that proposed to pay out only one percent.19 The
broad goal of uniformity was being undermined and bankruptcy was becoming
a device for debtor abuse. In the words of the credit industry, courts that were
allowing confirmation of plans that paid back as little as one percent were
"enticing a disturbingly large number of debtors into having their debts
avoided, often without [the] economic penalty of loss of assets being coupled to
the economic benefit of avoidance of their debts." 20 In an effort to create more
uniformity and to curb debtor abuse, Congress reformed the Code in 1984.21
B. Chapter 13 Relief
As the Code exists today, an individual debtor may file under three
different chapters: Chapter 7 (liquidation),22 Chapter 11 (repayment),23 or
Chapter 13 (repayment).24 In a Chapter 13, the debtor's income is divided into
two categories: disposable and nondisposable income.25 Nondisposable income
is income that is necessary for the support and maintenance of the debtor and
18 See, e.g., In re Raburn, 4B.R. 624 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1980).
19 See, e.g., In reJohnson, 6 B.R. 34 (Bankr. N.D. 11. 1980).
2 0 Banknptcy Reform. Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Conm, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 486, 488-89 (1983) (prepared statement of the International Consumer Credit
Association).
21 Congress stated the goals of the 1984 Amendments very generally. The first goal
was the eradication of the great disparities among various judicial districts in their
application of Chapter 13. The second goal was the uniform application of bankruptcy law
provisions nationally. Personal Bankruptcy: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomr. on
Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st &
2d Sess. 181-83 (1981-82) (statement of Hon. Conrad K. Cyr, Bankruptcy Judge); see
Karen Gross, Preserving a Fresh Start for the Individual Debtor: The Case for Narrow
Construction of the Conswer Credit Amendnents, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 59, 61-62 (1986)
("The Amendments were adopted in response to concerted pressure from the consumer
credit industry, ostensibly to eliminate perceived abuses of the Bankruptcy Code and the
bankruptcy process by individual debtors.") (footnotes omitted); Jeffrey W. Morris,
Substantive Consuner Bankruptcy Refonn in the Bankruptcy Amendnents Act of 1984, 27
WM. & MARY L. REV. 91, 137-63 (1985) (examination of changes designed to prevent
debtor abuse of Chapter 13).
22 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766.
23 Id. §§ 1101-1174. Generally, Chapter 11 is used for business bankruptcy, but see
infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
24 Id. §§ 1301-1330.
25 Id. § 1325(b)(1)(B).
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her family.26 A debtor must formulate a proposed budget detailing all of her
necessary expenses and submit the budget for court approval. 27 All other
income not included in the proposed budget is considered disposable income
and must be entirely devoted to the repayment of the debtor's unsecured
creditors.28
The minimum required length of a Chapter 13 repayment plan is three
years, although a creditor may request that the period be extended to five
years.29 At the end of the period of repayment, if the debtor has acted in good
faith, any unpaid portion of the unsecured debt is discharged-which means
that the debtor is relieved of the duty to make payments on the discharged
portion.30 The debtor receives a "fresh start."31
The Code mitigates the seeming unfairness of the discharge by allowing an
unsecured creditor, or the trustee in bankruptcy, who does not receive full
repayment to challenge the inclusion of items within the proposed budget that
he feels are frivolous, excessive, or unjustified.3 2 The court must then
determine if the challenged item is a "reasonably necessary" 33 expense. 34
The determination of what is reasonably necessary is not so difficult when
the challenged item is a luxury automobile,35 tuition to expensive private
26 Id. § 1325(b)(2)(A).
27 Id. § 1325(b)(1)(B).
28 Id.
29 Id. § 1322(c). The trustee in bankruptcy may also request the extension, or the court
may mandate the five year term if equity requires it.
30 Id. § 1328.
31 The goal of long-term rehabilitation of the debtor is commonly referred to as the
"fresh start" policy. Provided that the debtor has complied with the Code's requirements
and has surrendered executable assets or sufficient future income for distribution to
creditors, the debtor is entitled to a new beginning, unburdened by the unpaid balance of
prebankruptey debts. See LAWRENCE P. KING & MICHAEL L. COOK, CREDrroRs' RIGHTS,
DEBTORs' PROTECTION AND BANKRUPTCY 777 (1985); see also BRIAN A. BLUM,
BANKRUPTCY AND DEBTOR/CREDrrOR § 10.6 (1993); ELZABETH WARREN & JAY L.
WESTBROOK, Ti LAwoFDEBTORs AND CREDrroRs 199-225 (2d ed. 1991).
32 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1).
33 The 1984 Amendments to the Code define "luxury goods or services" as those that
are not reasonably necessary. Id. § 523(a)(2)(C). At least one commentator has drawn the
conclusion from that definition that all other goods are, in principle, "reasonably
necessary." HENRY J. SOMMER, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACnCE § 12.3.3 (3d
ed. 1988). Such a conclusion gains credibility in light of decisions such as In re Tinneberg,
59 B.R. 634, 635 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986), which held that money to buy a newspaper is
reasonably necessary and any denial of such would be inhumane.
3 4 COLLER ON BANKRUPTC § 1325.08 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. 1994).
35 See, e.g., In re Reyes, 106 B.R. 155, 157-58 (Bankr. N.D. II. 1989) (debtor's
purchase of extravagant four-wheel drive vehicle held to be an "obvious indulgence"); In re
[Vol. 56:307
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schools, 36 or large amounts of recreation expenses.37 But the decision becomes
much more complex when the challenged item is a tithe to the debtor's church.
The decision that must be made by a bankruptcy judge may evolve beyond
whether or not the tithe is reasonably necessary and implicate constitutional
concerns. 38 The decision is full of pitfalls and constitutional quagmires, and it
is not surprising that court decisions over the past ten years have been far from
uniform.
IL. THE JUDICIAL APPROACH TO THE TITHE IN BANKRUPTCY
In the years preceding the 1984 Amendments and in the years immediately
following, courts tended to ignore the free exercise implications of the tithe.
They were inclined to decide that the tithe, although a "noble thought and
gesture," 39 was an unnecessary expense when weighed against the debtor's
obligations to repay their debts. It was unfair to creditors because allowing the
tithe, in essence, forced the creditors to support the debtor's church.40
Rogers, 65 B.R. 1018, 1019-20 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986) (confirmation of plan was
denied because debtor chose to keep sports car with large debt still owed on it rather than
keep a less expensive car with a smaller unpaid balance).
36 See, e.g., In re Navarro, 83 B.R. 348, 354-57 (finding that tuition for religious
education is not per se unreasonable unless the expense is excessive).
37 See, e.g., In re Rybicki, 138 B.R. 225, 228-29 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1992) (a camper
not held to be a reasonably necessary expense); In re Struggs, 71 B.R. 96, 98 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1987) (motor home held to be a luxury item); In re Hedges, 68 B.R. 18, 20 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1986) (boat considered a luxury item because debtor's occupation did not require
its use).
38 The decision to allow or disallow the tithe as a reasonably necessary expense in the
context of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy could implicate the First Amendment rights of free
exercise, association, free speech, and the guarantee against an establishment of religion.
See supra note 12.
39 In re Sturgeon, 51 B.R. 82, 83 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1985).
40 See, e.g., In re Curry, 77 B.R. 969, 970 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987) (stating that "[t]he
effect of such a deduction is to permit the debtor to require that his creditors contribute to
his chosen charity"); In re Gaukler, 63 B.R. 224 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1986) (noting that the
debtors' "willingness to make religious contributions... smacks of irresponsibility.
Apparently they are willing, on the basis of church dictates, to sacrifice the financial well-
being of themselves and their children in order to make contributions they obviously cannot
afford."); In re Sturgeon, 51 B.R. at 83 (noting that although tithing is a "noble thought and
gesture" on the part of the debtor, there is no "church law requiring this donation; it is
more a matter of conscience"); In re Breckenridge, 12 B.R. 159, 160 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1980) (stating that "[clhurch tithes, per se, are certainly not held in disfavor by this Court.
However, in light of the severe financial difficulties of these debtors, it would appear
prudent that they devote maximum resources under the plan to the repayment of their
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It was not until 1987 that the free exercise implications of claiming a tithe
as a necessary expense were first addressed. In In re Green,41 a Michigan court
treated the problem as a free exercise issue and allowed the tithe over the
objections of the creditors. The court ruled that a "denial of the confirmation
solely because the debtors propose to tithe would be unconstitutional." 42 The
court reasoned that to condition the approval of the debtor's plan on the
requirement that the debtor stop tithing would put pressure on the debtor to
violate her religious beliefs. 43 The court held that "such a burden on religion
can be justified only by proof of a compelling state interest. " 44 The court could
find no such interest and ordered confirmation of the plan with the tithe.45
The Green analysis, however, has not gained much support in bankruptcy
courts. The vast majority of cases have rejected the constitutional approach of
Green.46 In fact, there are only a few decisions that have even confirmed a
obligations, leaving a matter of tithing to their church to a time when they can better afford
such a financial commitment."); In re Cadogan, 4 B.R. 598, 600 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1980)
(stating that "[s]he was advised by the court that this amount was excessive, in view of the
niggardly manner in which creditors were being treated and that if she wished to continue to
make this contribution, other expenditures would have to be reduced").
41 73 B.R. 893 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987), af'd., 103 B.R. 852 (W.D. Mich. 1988).
42 Id. at 895 (citing Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm., 480 U.S. 136 (1987)).
The Green court rejected the approach of In re Sturgeon, 51 B.R. 82, In re Breckenridge,
12 B.R. 159, and In re Cadogan, 4 B.R. 598. In re Green, 73 B.R. 894 n.1.
43 In re Green, 73 B.R. at 896.
44 Id But see David W. Chase, Case Comment, Resolving the Conflict Between
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code and the Free Exercise Cause-In re Green: A Step in
the Wrong Direction, 57 Miss. LJ. 163 (1987) (arguing that although the court properly
used the strict scrutiny analysis, it failed to take into account the legitimate government
interests of protecting third parties from injurious acts). Also, the state did not argue that a
compelling state interest existed that would justify the burden on religious expression.
Rather the state claimed that granting the tithe as an expense would violate the
Constitution's Establishment Clause. In re Green, 73 B.R. at 894-95.
45 In re Green, 73 B.R. at 894-95. On appeal, the District Court insinuated that denial
of the tithe would not violate the debtor's free exercise rights, but upheld the bankruptcy
court's decision because it found the exemption did not violate the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment. Michigan v. Green, 103 B.R. 852, 854 & n.2 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1988).
46 In re Reynolds dismissed the Green free exercise argument as dictum and denied
confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan because the debtor had included a tithe in the budget. 83
B.R. 684, 684-85 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988). The court instead focused on the "reasonably
necessary" requirement and determined that a small portion of the budget could be
dedicated to a tithe, but that "that amount will need to be below 3 % of gross income unless
very unusual circumstances are present." Id. at 685.
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debtor's plan in light of a provision for religious contributions.47 Perhaps the
courts were waiting for guidance from the Supreme Court-guidance that the
courts apparently got in the 1990 case Employment Division v. Smith.48
A Pennsylvania court, in In re Navarro, allowed the claimed tithe, but denied that a
constitutional issue was raised. 83 B.R. 348 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988). The court stated that
"the role of the bankruptcy court under 1325(b) is not to award or deny substantive
government benefits, but rather to balance the interests of various private parties according
to neutral principals [sic] emanating from Congress," and thus, the Constitution was not
implicated. Id. at 352. Rather, the court accepted that some level of religious or charitable
expenditures are necessary for the maintenance and support of Chapter 13 debtors. Id. at
356. And the court found that tithing was a reasonably necessary aspect of this particular
family's support. ld. at 357.
The Navarro court then proceeded to explain that even if a bankruptcy discharge was
deemed to be a government benefit, denial of a Chapter 13 confirmation would be
constitutionally permissible. Id. at 353. A debtor "could tithe from assets which are not
property of the estate, or could file (or convert to) a case under Chapter 7 .... " Id.
(citation omitted). The judge further stated that "[e]ven if I were to decide that strict scrutiny
is appropriate, I would find that application of section 1325(b) here serves a compelling
government interest: that being administration of the bankruptcy system and protection of
the legitimate interests of creditors." Id.
In re Miles held that "[w]hile church donations may be a source of inner strength and
comfort to those who feel compelled to make them, they are not necessary
for... maintenance or support of the debtor...." 96 B.R. 348, 350 (Bankr. N.D. Fla.
1989). In re Tucker found that to allow a Chapter 13 debtor "to deduct contributions to any
organization" would be to force "the debtor's creditors to contribute to the debtor's church
or favorite charity." 102 B.R. 219, 220 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1989).
The court in In re Packham held that to decide if a debtor has a "bona fide personal
commitment" would force courts to pass on the legitimacy of the organization to which the
debtor wished to contribute. 126 B.R. 603, 609 (Bankr. D. Utah 1991). The Packhan court
held that courts should not be making such decisions and that to avoid "superimposing its
values for those of the debtor" tithes should be held not necessary. Id. at 609-10.
47 In re McDaniel, 126 B.R. 782 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991) (finding judicial analysis of
the tithe to be acceptable). The McDaniel court held that a bankruptcy court would "not
violate the First Amendment by concluding that a proposed level of tithing in a particular
case is excessive, and thus not reasonably necessary, under the facts of the case." Id. at
785; In re Bien, 95 B.R. 281, 283 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989) (holding if the tithe is an
"integral part of the religion rather than a discretionary donation" then it must be allowed
because consideration of the tithe would fall "beyond the purview" of the court's inquiry).
Similar to Navarro, the court in Bien stated that the relevant test was "whether the proposed
expense fulfills a bona fide personal commitment to serve or promote some
religious... purpose" and whether that choice is nondiscretionary. Id. at 282; In re Green,
103 B.R. 893; In re Navarro, 83 B.R. 348.
48 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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IV. THE SMITH DECISION
In Smith, the petitioners had been fired from their jobs at a drug
rehabilitation organization because they ingested peyote for sacramental
purposes at a ceremony of the Native American Church. 49 When the petitioners
applied for unemployment benefits, they were determined to be ineligible for
compensation because they had been discharged for work-related
"misconduct." 50 The petitioners claimed that the government may not
condition the availability of unemployment compensation on an individual's
willingness to forego conduct required by religion.51 The Supreme Court
answered, however, that if prohibiting the exercise of religion is not the object
of the law, but merely the "incidental effect of a generally applicable and
otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended." 52
The Court went on to state that it had "never held that an individual's
religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law
prohibiting conduct that the state is free to regulate." 53 The Court held that
neutrally enacted laws "cannot interfere with... religious beliefs and
opinions, [but] they may with practices." 54 Thus, on its face, Smith appeared to
be directly applicable to the situation of tithing in bankruptcy.
The Code does not represent a case of the government trying to control
people's religious beliefs. The language of Chapter 13 and its legislative
history, rather, show an absence of any consideration of religion.55 Thus, any
effect on religion is an "incidental effect" of the type described by the Court in
49 Id. at 874.
50 Id.
5 1 Id. at 876.
52 Id. at 878.
53 Id. at 878-79.
54 Id. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1897)).
55 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1990). The legislative history is informative in this
regard:
Chapter 13 relief is essentially equitable, and contemplates a substantial effort by
the debtor to pay his debts. Such an effort, by definition, may require some sacrifices
by the debtor, and some alteration in prepetition consumption levels. Thus, the debtor
might reasonably be required to devote to the plan that portion of his income which is
not necessary for support of the debtor and his family. The courts may be expected to
determine norms for such support, and Labor Department cost of living figures may
provide some help. This approach will permit plans to be confirmed where the debtor
does make a substantial effort to pay his debts, even though the payment itself is not
substantial.
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Smith. Following Smith's reasoning, because section 1325(b) is a neutral,
secular piece of legislation that has, at most, an indirect effect on religious
conduct, debtors may not make a free exercise claim to justify inclusion of the
tithe as a reasonable and necessary expense.
The Supreme Court apparently had reinforced the approach of the majority
of bankruptcy courts.5 6 In deciding whether a tithe should be allowed, a
bankruptcy court could determine whether or not the tithe was "reasonably
necessary" without concern for its free exercise implications. But Smith was a
controversial decision. It was widely condemned by both scholars and jurists.5 7
Justice Souter called for the re-examination of Smith, finding it "an intolerable
tension in free-exercise law."58 Although little noticed by the general public,
reform of the Smith decision has been a top legislative priority of the American
religious community for the past two years.5 9 In response to religious outcry
and other pressures, Congress passed, and President Clinton signed into law,
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), which overruled the
Smith decision.60
In section 2 of the RFRA (Congressional Findings and Declaration of
Purposes), Congress found that because "laws 'neutral' toward religion may
burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious
exercise," 61 the compelling interest test established by Sherbert v. Verner62
S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. 22 (1983).
5 6 See supra part Mi.
57 See, e.g., Church of Lukum Babalu v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2248
(1993) (Souter, J., concurring); Milner S. Ball, The Unfree Exercise of Religion, 20 CAP.
U. L. REV. 39 (1991); Theresa Cook, 7he Peyote Case: A Return to Reynolds, 68 DENy.
U. L. RaV. 91 (1991); Richard K. Sherwin, Rhetorical Pluralism and the Discourse Ideal:
Countering Divson of Employment v. Smith, A Parable of Pagans, Politics, and
Majoritarian Rule, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 388 (1991); Karin M. Rebescher, Note, The Illusory
Enforcement of First Amendment Freedom. Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources v. Smith and the Abandonment of the Compelling Governmental Interest Test, 69
N.C. L. REv. 1332 (1991). But see William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free
Exerdse Reionism, 58 U. Cm. L. REv. 308 (1991).
58 Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. at 2248 (Souter, J., concurring).
59 Mark Silk, New Law Overturns Supreme Court, Expands Freedom to Practice
Religion, ATLANTrAJ. & CoNsT., Nov. 20, 1993, at E8.60 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488.
61 Id. § 2(a)(2).
62 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that government may substantially burden a person's
free exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to that person
is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest); see infra notes 75-80 and
accompanying text.
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should be restored "in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially
burdened" by governmental action.63
The implications of the RFRA upon the Code are uncertain. I propose,
however, that despite the overturning of Smith and the return to the Sherbert
free exercise analysis, the majority of bankruptcy courts are correct in not
analyzing the free exercise effects of tithing in a case-by-case approach. Denial
of the tithe as a "reasonably necessary" expense in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy is
not a denial of the free exercise of religion.64
63 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 § 2. The congressional findings and
declaration of purposes is as follows:
(a) FINDiNGS-The Congress finds that-
(1) the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion as an
inalienable right, secured its protection in the First Amendment to the Constitution;
(2) laws "neutral" toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws
intended to interfere with religious exercise;
(3) governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without
compelling justification;
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) the Supreme Court
virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious
exercise imposed by laws neutral towards religion; and
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a
workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing
prior governmental interests.
(b) PURPOEs-The purposes of this Act are-
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its
application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and
(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is
substantially burdened by government.
Id. (emphasis added).
64 The first test of the RFRA as it applies in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy was in a case
filed on May 23, 1994, in Minnesota. The Justice Department has sided with the creditors
that a tithe may not be claimed as a reasonably necessary expense. White House spokesman
Arthur Jones stated that the issue is a "straight application of the bankruptcy code. Because
the code applies to both religious and nonreligious organizations, we don't think there's an
implication for the RFRA." Goodstein, supra note 1.
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V. FREE EXERCISE ANALYSIS
A. Initial Asswnptions
The "freedom" guaranteed in the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment is not absolute. The Supreme Court has established two hurdles
that a person must clear before she may assert that her free exercise of religion
has been unlawfully violated. She must first establish that her religious belief is
sincere. She must then show that she views the religious practice in conflict
with the secular law as an obligation, and not a mere preference.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that a preliminary determination
of the sincerity of religious belief is essential to free exercise analysis. 65 In
United States v. Seeger,66 the Court stated that although the "'truth' of a belief
is open to question, there remains the significant question whether it is 'truly
held.' This is the threshold question of sincerity which must be resolved in
every case."67
Such a demonstration is necessary in order to avoid the danger of people
taking advantage of religious exemption for reasons other than the dictates of
their faith. 68 Thus, to prevent fraudulent claims the court must inquire into the
debtor's faith to establish that the belief in tithing is sincere. Such an inquiry is
necessary in a Chapter 13 petition because an individual seeking Chapter 13
relief must pay as much of the debt incurred as possible.69 When debtors claim
a religious obligation to tithe, they are, in effect, asking for a deduction in the
amount of debt they owe. The possibilities for abuse are obvious. Debtors
would certainly rather give money to family, friends, or their church than to
65 Although the Court requires an inquiry into the sincerity of religious belief, it rejects
inquiries into the "centrality" of a given practice or belief. See, e.g., Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886-87 (1990) ("Judging the centrality of different religious practices
is akin to the unacceptable 'business of evaluating the relative merits of different religious
claims.'") (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1983) (Stevens, I.,
concurring)); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) ("It is not within the
judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the
validity of particular litigants' interpretation of those creeds.").
66 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
67 Id. at 185.
68 For example, the debtor could use the tithe as a last minute allocation to her church.
If the debtor had never tithed before, or her church did not require tithing, or most of the
members of her church did not tithe, then the contribution is best viewed as a fraudulent
conveyance, and not as an expression of religious freedom. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2).
69 Id. § 1325(b).
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their creditors who they often perceive as impersonal entities that are
persecuting them.
Second, the obligation to tithe must be more than a preference-the debtor
must view it as an obligation. A debtor who merely chooses to tithe should not
be eligible for an exemption based upon the Free Exercise Clause. 70 The
Supreme Court has clearly limited constitutional protection only to those whose
challenged conduct was mandated by their religious beliefs. 71 Those beliefs,
however, do not have to be the credo of a particular religion. Rather, the
Supreme Court has framed the inquiry in terms of the particular religious
adherent's subjective belief.72
Thus, if the Free Exercise Clause is implicated, bankruptcy judges must first
determine if the individual debtor sincerely believes that tithing is an obligation
of her religion. Also, debtors who merely choose to tithe would not be eligible.
Constitutional protection extends only to those individuals who are forced to
cease participation in one of the precepts of their faith in order to receive a
government benefit. Many dangers exist in this awkward preliminary
assessment. Arguably, most courts lack the competence to assess sincerity in a
religious context. Also, in defining "religion" there is the danger of judicial
imposition of values. Courts will be forced to walk a narrow line in trying not
7 0 The debtor should not be eligible because constitutional protection only extends to
those people who are forced to choose between receiving a government benefit and the
dictates of their faith. See generally Russell W. Galloway, Basic Free Exercise Analysis, 29
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 865, 869-71 (1989).
71 In Sherbert v. Verner, the Court ruled that to condition the receipt of government
benefits upon the claimant's "willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith
effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties." 374 U.S. 398, 406
(1963). Similarly, in Thomas v. Review Bd., the Court held:
Where the State conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed
by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by
religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his
behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists.
450 U.S. 707, 717-18; see also Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm., 480 U.S. 136
(1987).
72 See Thomas for an example of the Court's acceptance of subjectively based religious
beliefs. In Thomas, despite the fact that the claimant's beliefs were in contrast with those of
the other members of his faith, and that they were inconsistent and illogical, the Court
determined that the free exercise doctrine should be applied. 450 U.S. at 714-16; see also
LAuRENcE H. TRiNE, AmmcAN CONSTnriTONAL LAW 1243 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the
Thomas decision).
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to make impermissible content judgments regarding what is and is not a
"proper" religious conviction. 73
Furthermore, courts can anticipate an increase in fraudulent tithing claims in
the face of the inherent difficulty of proving that a person really does not
believe in what she professes to believe. Court time and costs will also
increase. But if a constitutional right is really infringed, then an increase in
costs and the creation of a situation where judges must make very difficult and
personal decisions are not excuses for ignoring that right.
B. Free Exercise Jurisprudence
It is unnecessary to give a detailed history of the Supreme Court's Free
Exercise jurisprudence because of the recent enactment of the RFRA. The
RFRA explicitly states in section 2 that the purpose of the law is "to restore the
compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner."74
The Sherbert case involved a Seventh Day Adventist's claim of exemption
from a Saturday work requirement under state unemployment law.75 The Court
formulated a version of strict scrutiny as the prevailing standard for free
exercise exemption claims.76
The approach is a two-step inquiry. First, the court must determine if the
regulation in question imposes a substantial burden on the claimant's religious
belief.77 Second, if the burden is established, the court should consider whether
"some compelling state interest.., justifies the substantial infringement of [the
claimant's] First Amendment right." 78 As presented in Sherbert, this standard
is used in analysis of all regulations of religious conduct-whether direct or
indirect. 79
73 Critics have pointed out in the past that such inquiries have tended to favor
mainstream religions and those minority sects that share significant points in common with
the mainstream beliefs. The more "bizarre" the belief in question, the more likely it is to be
labeled "nonreligious" or "insincere." See William P. Marshall, "We Know It When We See
It":• The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 495, 512 (1986); William
P. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemama: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L.
REV. 545, 555-56 (1983).
74 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488.
For the text of the RFRA, see supra note 63.
75 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
76 Id.
77 Id. at403.
78 Id. at 406.
79 Ld. at 403-04.
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Thus, two questions must be answered: whether denial of religious tithing
to Chapter 13 debtors would substantially burden the free exercise of their
religion, and if so, whether the government's refusal to allow tithes is
necessary to support a compelling governmental interest.80
C. Substantial Burden
At first glance the denial of a sincere religious obligation to tithe does place
a substantial burden on the bankruptcy debtor. Denial of the tithe apparently
could deprive the debtor of important religious expression, religious
association, and the benefits of church membership. Denial of the tithe also
apparently affects even more deeply held religious beliefs. Some debtors may
believe that to cease tithing may threaten their very salvation. Thus, it appears
that whether or not the denial of the tithe places a substantial burden on the
debtor is irrefutable. But first impressions can be deceiving.
The premise behind the above arguments is that the debtor has no choice-
that the denial of the tithe forces the debtor to choose between a financial fresh
start and their religious obligations. To make that assumption, however, is to
assume that all people have a right to a Chapter 13 bankruptcy and that there
are no other bankruptcy alternatives. Neither of these assumptions is true.
Chapter 13 relief is not available to everyone who applies. Only an
individual with regular income may be a debtor under Chapter 13. 81 Thus, if
religious adherents cannot prove regular income, then no matter how much
they want Chapter 13 relief, they will not receive it. Chapter 13 relief is also
available only to debtors with relatively small estates: as of the date of the
bankruptcy petition, the debtor's noncontingent, liquidated unsecured debts
must be less than $100,000, and noncontingent liquidated secured debts must
be less than $350,000.82 Also, if the debtor wishes to file a joint petition, the
combined debts must be within the limits set for an individual. 83 Thus, a
claimant who wishes to tithe and has a large amount of debt may not seek
Chapter 13 relief. Also, if the debtor is a stockbroker or a commodity broker
she cannot file under Chapter 13. 84
In addition to the requirements that a Chapter 13 debtor file in good faiths5
and allocate all of her disposable income to the payment plan,86 there are the
80 d. at 403.
81 11 U.S.C. § 109(e).
82 Id. An example of a secured debt that will often make people ineligible is a home
mortgage.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. § 1325(a)(3).
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preliminary requirements that a debtor must meet before she can even file a
petition.87 To view the denial of a tithing exemption as a substantial burden is a
mistake, for it assumes that the debtor's choices are either to cease tithing or to
give up the opportunity to work out one's debt.88 That assumption is not the
case, however. Chapter 13 is not the only provision under which a debtor may
file, and it is not always the most advantageous chapter under which a debtor
may file. Rather, Chapter 13 is the most restrictive in terms of who may and
may not claim relief under it. The choice is not Chapter 13 or financial ruin-it
is Chapter 13 with no tithe, Chapter 11, Chapter 7, or file no bankruptcy and
work out debt without government aid.89
Commentators tend to assume that all other chapters offer nothing to the
debtor,90 but that assumption is not true. If a debtor wishes to tithe, she may
opt for a Chapter 7 in which all but exempted assets will be liquidated and sold
in payment of her debts.91 The debtor's debts are then discharged
immediately. 92 The debtor may then begin to tithe immediately from her new
income.93 A misconception of Chapter 7 is that it will leave the debtor destitute
and that all of her assets will be gone. But this concept is not correct, the point
of Chapter 7 bankruptcy is to repay creditors and to help the debtor obtain a
fresh start.9 4 The debtor is able to keep a portion of her interest in her home,95
86 Id. § 1325(b).
87 Id. § 109(e); see supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
88 But see Donald R. Price & Mark C. Rahdert, Dirti'buting the First Fruits: Statutory
and Constitutional Implications of Tithing in Bankruptcy, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 853, 907
(1993) (arguing that because Chapter 7 is not very attractive, the debtor must either accept
the court's budget or give up the opportunity to work out her debt).
89 Bankruptcy is not the only method to work out debt payment. State law offers many
remedies that may be preferable to bankruptcy because they do not stain one's credit
record. For example, execution, garnishment, judgment liens, and voluntary liens.
90 See, e.g., Price & Rahdert, supra note 88; Carol Koenig, Comment, To ithe or
Not to ithe: The Constitutionality of ithing in a Chupter 13 Bankruptcy Budget, 32 SANTA
CLARAL. REv. 1231, 1246-47 (1992).
91 11 U.S.C. § 726.
92 Discharge is granted during the course of the case, after expiry of the period for
filing objections to discharge. RuLEs OFPRAC. & PRoc. INBANKR. 4004.
93 All of the debtor's postpetition income is property of the debtor, thus the debtor may
use it as he sees fit. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6); see BLUM, supra note 31, § 28.3.
94 11 U.S.C. § 522 (allowing exemptions that are granted at the expense of creditors,
whose recourse is limited to nonexempt assets); see generally KING & COOK, supra note 31.
95 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1). Under § 522(b) of the Code, states are authorized to "opt
out" of the federal scheme and provide their own exemptions. Currently, 39 states have
opted-out. Thus a debtor filing for federal bankruptcy in those states may only exempt
property that is protected by that state's laws. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 31, at
226-27.
19951
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
motor vehicle,96 jewelry,97 household goods, 98 clothes, 99 animals, °0 books, 10 1
professional books and tools of the trade,102 life insurance,10 3 health aids, 1' 4
government benefits,105 and the like. 06
Although usually used by a business for bankruptcy, the Supreme Court
has held that an individual debtor can also use Chapter 11 as well.107 The
debtor may wish to use Chapter 11 if she would like to keep her property and
make payments. Under Chapter 11, just like under Chapter 13, estate property
is revested in the debtor upon confirmation of the plan of repayment.' 0 8 But,
unlike Chapter 13, the creditors vote on the plan and the debtor is allowed to
solicit votes. °0 The debtor may bargain for the right to tithe. Also, the plan's
length is not limited to three or five years, but may be as short or as long as the
debtor wishes it to be. There is no statutory limit to payments; the length is set
by the plan. 110
The biggest advantage that Chapter 13 has over Chapter 11 or Chapter 7 is
that the discharge in Chapter 13 allows the debtor to discharge debts that would
not be dischargeable in the other chapters. 111 These dischargeable debts include
fines or damages for willful or malicious injury, 112 for fraud while acting in a
96 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(2).
9 7 Id § 522(d)(4).
98 Id. § 522(d)(3).
99 Id.
10 0 Id.
101 Id.
102 I. § 522(d)(6).
103 Id. § 522(d)(7).
104 Id. § 522(d)(9).
105 Id. § 522(d)(10)(A)-(C).
106 In addition to the listed exemptions, debtors are allowed to exempt up to $4150 in
any property they choose. Id. § 522(d)(5). Debtors also receive the following exemptions:
alimony, child support or maintenance; pension plan; crime victim award; wrongful death
award; personal injury award; and loss of future earnings. Id. § 522(d)(10)-(11).107 Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991).
108 11 U.S.C. § 1141(b).
109 Id. § 1129.
110 Id. § 1121.
111 Under § 1328(a), after the debtor finishes all payments under the plan, the debtor
will be discharged from all debts provided for by the plan or disallowed under § 502, except
debts on which final payment is due after the plan is completed (§ 1322(b)(5) debts) and
alimony and support payments (§ 523(a)(5) debts). Id. § 1325(a). In contrast, in a Chapter 7
or 11 discharge, all prepetition debts are excused except for those in § 523. Id. § 727 &
§ 1141.112 Id. § 523(a)(6).
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fiduciary capacity, for embezzlement or larceny,113 and for obtaining money,
property, or services under false pretenses or by fraud. 14 These extra
discharges are granted only if the debtor finishes all payments under the
plan." 5 Chapter 13 debtors, however, fail in large numbers with fewer than
one-third still making payments an average of two years after confirmation. 116
If a debtor does fail, the court may still grant a discharge, but only if: (1) the
failure to complete the payments was caused by circumstances outside the
debtor's control, (2) the unsecured creditors received plan payments not less
than the amount to which they would have been entitled under Chapter 7, and
(3) the plan cannot be modified. 1 7 But a hardship discharge when the plan fails
is the same as a discharge under Chapter 7 or 11. Thus, the main reason a
debtor would choose a Chapter 13 is lost if that debtor, like most debtors, does
not complete the payments as set out in the plan.
It appears that for most debtors who wish to file under Chapter 13 and
sincerely claim a tithing exemption, the denial of the exemption would not be a
substantial burden. The debtor still has the option of two other chapters from
which to gain relief, along with the available state law remedies. It is possible
to argue, however, that despite the other options available, and the likelihood
that most debtors will fail in a Chapter 13 plan, the denial of Chapter 13 relief
is still a substantial burden. But even if the denial of such relief was determined
to be a substantial burden and did effectively prohibit the debtor's free exercise
of her religious obligations, the judge should still deny the tithing exemption
under the free exercise strict scrutiny standard set forth in Sherbert.1 8
D. Compelling Interest
If the denial of the tithing exemption has been determined to be a
substantial burden on the religion of the debtor, then the court must inquire
whether the government interests behind Chapter 13 can be regarded as
compelling and whether refusal to allow tithes narrowly serves those
interests.119
The governmental interest does not have to be of central importance to the
government to be compelling for purposes of free exercise scrutiny. For
113 Id. § 523(a)(4).
114 Id. § 523(a)(2).
115 Id. § 1328(a).
116 Se TERESA A. SULLIVAN El AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS 222 (1989).
117 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b).
118 See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
119 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
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example, in Goldman v. Weinberger,120 the Court found a compelling state
interest in securing military uniformity of dress. In United States v. Lee,121 the
Court ruled against an Amish claim that paying taxes violated their belief in
personal responsibility to take care of members of the community. The
Supreme Court found that the government's interest in "maintaining a sound
tax system" free from a "myriad of exceptions flowing from a wide variety of
religious beliefs" overrode a claim for religious exemption. 122 In Braunfeld v.
Brown,123 the Court rejected a free exercise claim brought by Orthodox Jews
to challenge Sunday closing laws. The Court found providing a day of rest to
be a compelling governmental interest. 124
Bowen v. Roy, 125 however, may be most indicative of the Court's free
exercise approach. In that case, a Native American objected to the Social
Security Administration's use of a Social Security number in connection with
welfare benefits for his daughter. 126 The Court accepted at face value his claim
that use of the number would, according to his Abenaki religious beliefs, rob
his daughter of her spirit' 27-an undeniably substantial burden on religion. But
the Court ruled for the government. 128 It accepted the government's claim that
its need to use Social Security numbers for administrative efficiency and
control of fraud was enough to override the heavy religious burden. 129
If "maintaining a sound tax system" free from a "myriad of exceptions" is
a compelling governmental interest, then it appears that maintaining a sound
bankruptcy system is compelling as well. And if, as in Bowen, administrative
efficiency and reduction in fraudulent conveyances are compelling interests,
then it would seem apparent that administrative efficiency and the reduction of
fraudulent conveyances through tithing are also compelling interests.
120 475 U.S. 503 (1986); see also Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971)
(concluding that requiring military conscription of persons religiously opposed to particular
wars, as opposed to all wars, does not violate the Free Exercise Clause).
121 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
122 Id. at 260; see also Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S.
378 (1990) (holding that imposition of sales and use tax on distribution of religious materials
does not violate the Free Exercise Clause); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680
(1989) (finding denial of tax deduction for religious payment does not violate the Free
Exercise Clause).
123 366 U.S. 599 (1961).124 Id.
125 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
126 Id. at 695.
127Id. at 696.
128 Id. at 712.
129 Id. at709.
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E. Ambiguity Due to Amount
Another aspect of the tithe argument makes it inherently self-defeating. If
tithes were to be allowed as exemptions, courts would have to deal further with
the question of amount. Once a bankruptcy court has decided that tithing is an
allowable expense, it may confront a range of claims running from very modest
to extremely large ones. The court must then apply the same constitutional
principles that allowed the tithe itself to the amount claimed. To be consistent,
the court should accommodate not only the individual's decision to tithe, but
also her decision regarding the amount. 130
In some situations, honoring the debtor's decision as to amount would
prevent significant repayment of creditors. 131 If the amount of the tithe would
be so high as to make the payment to creditors less than they would receive in
Chapter 7, the debtor would be forced out of Chapter 13.132 Or if repayment
were to reach low levels such as one percent, the situation would be exactly
what the 1984 Amendments were trying to correct. 133
For a debtor whose required tithe amount is so high that creditors will
receive greatly diminished repayment, the court must deny the debtors Chapter
13 relief, or cut the amount of the tithe. How much should it be reduced?
Reducing the tithe would be exactly the type of violation of the Free Exercise
Clause that those who argue for allowing the tithe seek to avoid. To deny a
debtor Chapter 13 relief because of the amount of her tithe is to refuse to ratify
the plan solely because of the tithe. Thus, those who argue that the tithe must
be an allowable expense will assuredly face a situation when they will be forced
to violate the rights of the person they sought to protect.
13 0 To be consistent, if a court is to honor sincere religious belief, the same burdens on
religion that result from failure to contribute anything to the church can also result from
failure to give as much as one's religion commands. This point is especially true if the
church conditions fill participation in the life of the church on the act of tithing a specific
amount, as some religions do. For example, one bankruptcy court reports that the Church
of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints (the Mormon Church), requires its members to tithe
in order to remain in good standing with the church. The Mormons find this obligation in
the passage from Malachi 3:8-12. See text supra note 4; In re Packham, 126 B.R. 603, 604
n.2 (Bankr. D. Utah 1991).
131 As the amount of the tithe that the debtor claims as a reasonably necessary expense
increases, the amount of income available to pay creditors decreases progressively.
132 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) provides that the court should confirm the proposed plan if,
among other things, "the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be
distributed under the plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is not less than the
amount that would be paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor were liquidated under
chapter 7 of this title on such date."
133 See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The RFRA does not require that debtors who seek bankruptcy relief must
be allowed to give to their god before their creditors. The RFRA requires that
the government have a compelling interest when government actions
substantially burden the exercise of religion. 134
The denial of a tithe exemption in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy does not create
a substantial burden on the religion of the claimant. The debtor is not forced to
decide between her religion and bankruptcy relief, but may file under another
chapter of the Code. If the denial were a substantial burden, then the goals of
maintaining administrative efficiency, providing predictability and substance to
the repayment of creditors, and avoiding fraud would be sufficient to form a
compelling governmental interest to impose a substantial burden on religion.
Thus, denial of the tithe does not violate the free exercise rights of the debtor
that are guaranteed by the First Amendment.
Denial of the tithe serves useful purposes as well. Not forcing courts to
inquire into the personal religious convictions of debtors prevents the
imposition of judicial values upon the debtor. The court system is also
benefited by a denial of tithing as a necessary expense because of the
administrative costs saved from not having to conduct a detailed inquiry.
Although there are costs to any decision concerning the differing interests
between the government and an individual's religion, the best choice in the
conflict between tithing and Chapter 13 bankruptcy relief is to deny the tithing
as an unreasonable and unnecessary expense.
134 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488.
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